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Abstract
In this paper we focus on the timing of marriages of women, whose mar-
riages are associated with bride wealth payments, which are transfers from
(the family of) the groom to the bride’s family. Unmarried daughters could
therefore be considered assets who, at times of need, can be cashed in. We
investigate both theoretically and empirically to what extent the timing
of a marriage of a daughter is affected by the economic conditions of the
household from which she originates. We distinguish household specific
wealth levels and two types of shocks: correlated (weather) shocks and id-
iosyncratic (wealth) shocks. We estimate a duration model using a unique
panel survey of Zimbabwean smallholder farmers. The estimation results
support the hypothesis that the timing of marriage is affected by household
characteristics; girls from households that experienced a negative idiosyn-
cratic (wealth) shock are more likely to marry.
1 Introduction
In developing countries economic markets are often absent or incomplete. The ab-
sence of economic markets is particularly severe in rural areas, where smallholder
farmers lack access to formal financial and insurance institutions. This implies
that these farmers often face liquidity constraints and that they cannot insure
against a bad harvest or loss of livestock. Whereas a bad harvest has immedi-
ate but generally temporary consequences for farmers’ welfare, the consequences
for welfare of loss of livestock are long lasting. In rural Zimbabwe, for instance,
income from agricultural production mainly depends on two factors, sufficient
rainfall and the availability of cattle. Cattle are necessary as draft power for
plowing. Without cattle households can only produce using the hoe, which yields
little income. Loss of livestock might therefore lead to a household being stuck
in poverty for a considerable period of time (see Carter and Zimmerman, 2000).
The lack of formal financial institutions does not allow farmers to borrow
for investments in agricultural production or buying cattle. A large range of
non-market solutions has become available to insure households against negative
shocks and to allow them to smooth consumption over time. Examples of such
non-market solutions are food sharing arrangements in which a household, who
faced a negative idiosyncratic shock gets food from other households in the village,
and labor sharing arrangements under which within a village farmers take care
of the land of someone who is temporary unable to do so. Rosenzweig (2001)
provides a review of the literature on informal insurance arrangements in low-
income countries.
The focus of this paper is on the timing of marriage as an alternative in-
stitution for insurance against the loss of livestock. That marriage may act as
a non-market insurance is due to the fact that marriages involve bride wealth
payments. In the empirical analyses we consider rural Zimbabwe, where these
payments are made by (the family of) the groom to the bride’s family. Bride
wealth comprises of a substantial number of cattle of which a considerable frac-
tion is paid at the moment of the actual marriage. An unmarried daughter thus
represents access to livestock and her marriage may be considered an asset that
can be cashed in times of adversity. Because of bride wealth payments, marriages
should be considered as a contract between two families rather than between
two individuals. However, the choice of the spouse is generally not a household
decision, but an individual decision. Therefore, we do not focus on the choice of
spouses, but instead consider the timing of the marriage.
The bride’s family can use the cattle obtained as bride wealth for increasing
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agricultural production and as buffer stock. The marriage decision of a daughter
is therefore more likely to be a household decision in poor households than in
wealthier households. In the empirical analyses, we investigate to what extent the
timing of marriage of young women can be explained by the economic conditions
of the households from which they originate.
There are many aspects to how shocks affect marriages. It is particularly im-
portant to distinguish between correlated shocks induced by a lack of sufficient
rainfall and idiosyncratic shocks to households for example as a result of theft
or death of cattle. Not surprisingly correlated and idiosyncratic shocks can have
quite different effects on household behavior. Unlike idiosyncratic shocks, corre-
lated shocks may have equilibrium effects on the marriage market. If after a year
of low rainfall households press daughters to marry, households may prefer that
sons do not marry. It may therefore be the case that after a year of low rain-
fall actually less marriages occur. This may have consequences for the amount
of bride wealth. If after a year of low rainfall women are more eager to marry
than men, then the amount of bride wealth is expected to be lower. We return to
these issues in our theoretical model, where we will distinguish between correlated
and idiosyncratic shocks. The theoretical model serves as a starting point for our
empirical analyses where we consider the timing of a daughter’s marriage and
the amount of bride wealth. Also in the empirical model we distinguish between
idiosyncratic and correlated shocks.
A strong impact of the household’s economic situation on the timing of mar-
riage suggests that formal risk sharing and credit markets work indeed unsatis-
factorily. Such knowledge can be beneficial for policy, especially in the context
of economic development. Furthermore, the presence of the use of bride wealth
as an informal insurance device may cause women to marry younger. This may
affect fertility, is likely to increase average household size, which has implications
for population growth, poverty and - to the extend that poorer households are
more likely to be larger - will increase inequality.
A dynamic model is required to empirically analyze the timing of a marriage.
Such a model is required because the composition of the population of unmarried
women in a particular year depends on marriages in previous years. If due to some
shock, for example a drought, in a particular year many women in poor house-
holds marry, it follows that in the following year the population of unmarried
women shifts towards women from richer households. To account for this we use
hazard rates to model the age of marriage. We allow the transition rate from being
unmarried to being married (the marriage rate) to depend on observed explana-
tory variables, both individual, household and environmental characteristics, on
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the elapsed duration of being unmarried (age), and on unobserved determinants.
To model the relationship between the marriage rate and these variables, we use
a Mixed Proportional Hazard specification (see e.g. Lancaster, 1990). To avoid
initial conditions problems we use flow sampling to construct our data set. To
separate idiosyncratic shocks from household specific wealth levels and correlated
shocks, we use a dynamic model for household wealth accumulation. Finally, we
also perform empirical analyses on the amount of bride wealth payments. How-
ever, due to the limited information on the amount of bride wealth involved with
the observed marriages, the empirical results based on the size of bride wealth
should be interpreted with care.
The data we use are from an annual panel survey held under a group of reset-
tlement farmers in Zimbabwe which started in 1982. In the earlier surveys only
household level variables were collected, but from 1994 onwards detailed infor-
mation on all individual members of households is recorded. We use the subset
of the data that starts in 1994, which includes approximately 400 households.
The data on household members allows us to construct subsamples of unmarried
daughters, which include information on the marriage decision, individual char-
acteristics and some measures of household wealth. Since the data we use in the
empirical analyses deal with farmers, in the remainder of the paper we restrict
our discussions to farmers and rural areas.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the institution of marriage in
rural Zimbabwe is considered in more detail. Section 3 presents both the theo-
retical and empirical model. Section 4 describes the data. The estimation results
are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Cattle and marriage in Zimbabwe
In the introduction the importance of cattle to Zimbabwean smallholder farmers
as source of draft power for transportation and especially for plowing is already
stressed. The heavy loam soils in rural Zimbabwe require at least two head of
cattle, preferably trained oxes, to prepare land for sowing. Without two draft
animals, a household has little choice but to rely on labor intensive land prepa-
ration using the hoe. The income obtained from farming manually is low, and
insufficient to buy new cattle. Money can be obtained in off farm jobs, but these
jobs are hard to find (during our observation period the urban unemployment
rate was around 50%). Because of the absence of formal financial markets, bor-
rowing money to buy cattle is impossible. A household without cattle can try to
borrow cattle from neighbors after they are done with plowing. Typically, by the
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time the animals are available, the time for planting has passed while the beasts
are tired from their earlier effort and of little use. Households without cattle can
try to save (in the form of goats and chicken) from their meager crop incomes,
and in this way accumulate the wealth to buy cattle. Yet it might take a long
time before a sufficient amount is accumulated (Carter and Zimmerman, 2000).
Households therefore have a strong incentive to avoid that the number of cattle
becomes too small.
There are other reasons why cattle are of great significance to Zimbabwean
farmers. Cattle provide milk, produce manure to fertilize the land and in times of
need they can be eaten or sold in return for grain.1 Selling cows to buy food is only
relied upon as a measure of last resort. Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas (1998) show
for Burkina Faso for instance that during long periods of drought, cattle sales only
compensated 15% to 30% of income losses. Still, in Zimbabwe during the 1992 and
1995 droughts, the sale of cattle and other livestock was the single most important
way to obtain cash to purchase food (see Kinsey, Burger and Gunning, 1998). The
absence of formal financial institutions not only makes cattle an important buffer
stock it is also an important means to keep savings (e.g. Fafchamps, Udry and
Czukas, 1998; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). In this light, weight increase of a
cow and the birth of a calf can be considered as interest on these savings, while
the aging of the cattle represents inflation. Since the possession of cattle is vital
for agricultural production, cattle ownership in Zimbabwe is highly correlated
with other forms of asset ownership (Scoones, 1995). Furthermore, cattle can be
used as legal tender. Not only to settle debt, but also in civil or criminal cases a
traditional court may convict someone to pay a number of cattle. Finally, Tsodzo
(1992) argues that also a great social value is attached to possessing many head
of cattle (”he who dispenses with them, dispenses with good living”).
Next let us turn to the process of marriage in Zimbabwe. It is characterized by
duality as the choice of one’s spouse is left to the individuals concerned, while the
marriage itself is considered a contract between families. The latter is illustrated
by the relationship terminology that is adopted. After marriage, the groom’s
father-in-law becomes father-in-law to the whole of the groom’s family, while the
father of the groom is regarded as the principle son-in-law rather than the groom
himself. A brother of the groom is likely to speak in the first person saying “I
have married such and such family”.
A marriage provides a bond between two families, and Zimbabwean families
1Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas (1998) note that African farmers rarely kill their cattle for
eating the meat. Zimbabwean farmers may be even more reluctant to do so, since unlike in
Burkina Faso, cattle are used for agricultural production.
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related through marriage typically share resources in an effort to deal with risks.
Families prefer to spread the net of affinal relations by marrying into different
families. Marriages over a long distance or with someone with a job in town are
considered with favor as these mitigate the impact of local weather shocks (see
also Rosenzweig, 1988, and Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989).
Zimbabwean marriages include bride wealth payments, which are transfers
from the family of the groom to the family of the bride. Bride wealth in Zimbabwe
consists of two distinct payments, which are referred to as rutsambo and danga.
Rutsambo is associated with sexual rights to the woman and after its payment
the girl is allowed to move to her husband’s household. Danga is associated with
rights over children born to the woman. Cattle are the main body of the bride
wealth. On average 9 head of cattle are demanded as bride wealth.
At the moment of marriage a substantial part of danga is paid, but the bulk
of danga remains outstanding. Full payment of danga is extended over a long
period of time. In Figure 1 we show how the fraction of marriages where all bride
wealth payments are made evolves over the duration of the marriage. For less
than 10% of the marriages all bride wealth payments are made in the first few
years after the marriage. For over 80% of the marriages some part of the bride
wealth payments is still outstanding after 25 years of marriage. The large drop
occurs around 30 years of marriage, which implies that for most marriages the
final bride wealth payments are made between 28 to 35 years of marriage. The
bulk of the bride wealth thus remains outstanding after the marriage, which has
advantages for both the family of the bride and the family of the groom. For the
son-in-law, delayed payment implies that he can pay when he has the means to
do so. Moreover, he can make sure that his wife is childbearing. Being barren is
a valuable reason to undo a marriage. After a divorce or if the wife dies without
giving birth to many children the husband can claim back (part of) the bride
wealth. On the other hand, as long as the bride wealth is not completely paid,
the family of the bride can ask the groom for favors in the form of services and
gifts. This is illustrated by a Zimbabwean proverb saying: ”A son-in-law is like
a fruit tree: one never finishes eating from it”. Furthermore, delayed payments
secure that a household that loses its cattle still has access to some assets (see
Dekker and Hoogeveen, 2002). Therefore, even if the son-in-law is in the position
to pay all bride wealth upon marriage, it is considered a denial of the marriage
bond between the families involved to actually do so.
The optimal timing of marriage is evident. Unless the household is very
wealthy sons should marry late and daughters early. Late marriage of a son has
several advantages. The son remains productive in the family’s agricultural ac-
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tivities and the loss of draft power is postponed. If a household is poor, daughters
should marry early. After the marriage of a daughter the previously poor family
is able to experience a period of high productivity before the marriage of a son
is supported. This period of high productivity can be used to accumulate more
cattle and to grow out of the initial period of poverty. Another reason why daugh-
ters should marry young is that the amount of bride wealth decreases with age,
which reflects that relative to older women, young women are likely to give birth
to more children. National data confirm this pattern; the marriage age of men
is much higher than of women (see Central Statistical Office, 1995). The median
age at first marriage for men is 25 years, compared with 19 years for women.
Only 11 percent of the men are married by the age of 20, compared to 62 percent
of the women. In the next section we analyze the optimal timing of marriage in
more detail by developing a theoretical model of household behavior.
3 Model
In this section we present our theoretical and empirical model. The theoretical
model is a dynamic model of household behavior. The purpose of the model is
to illustrate the effects of wealth, household size and shocks on the household’s
marriage decision. We do not estimate this model, but instead it serves as a start-
ing point for the empirical analyses. The empirical model focuses on unmarried
women and the transition rate to being married, i.e. the marriage rate. In the
empirical model we explicitly take account of elements that are important in the
theoretical model.
3.1 Theoretical model
In this subsection we provide a theoretical model of household behavior of Zim-
babwean farmers. We explicitly model the household decision whether or not to
marry off a daughter. In particular, we construct a discrete time dynamic pro-
gramming model taking into account credit constraints, risk, and uncertainty (see
for example Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; and chapter 8 in Bardhan and Udry,
1999). It should be noted that in this model we ignore alternative consumption
smoothing or risk-sharing mechanism mentioned in the introduction.
Upon resettlement each household was provided with 12 acres of land, which
can be used for agricultural production. The land presented to the households is
about 10% of the total area; the remaining 90% is common property land, which
might be used for grazing. In our data 79% of the households uses less than the
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12 acres of land for agricultural production, 9% uses exactly 12 acres and the
remaining 12% uses more than 12 acres. For most households the availability of
land is thus not the binding constraint in their agricultural production especially
as households can use more than 12 acres of land if they (illegally) reclaim some
common property land or rent land from other farmers.
Farmers in resettlement schemes differ from regular smallholder farmers in
Zimbabwe. The resettlement farmers possess more land and until 1992 heads of
households were not allowed to work off farm. This is reflected in the way income
is generated. Unlike regular farmers who obtain approximately 30% of their in-
come from non-farm sources, resettlement farmers earn only 5% to 10% of their
income off farm. Farmers in the resettlement scheme are also somewhat wealth-
ier than regular farmers and their per capita expenditures are about 10% higher
than the per capita expenditures of ordinary smallholder farmers (Deininger and
Hoogeveen, 2004).
The household’s agricultural production depends mainly on three sources,
the input of labor, the availability of cattle and the amount of rainfall. Let qt
denote the production of crop in year t, which follows the production function
f(Bt,Mt, Rt), where Bt is the head of cattle owned by the household, Mt is
the number of (unmarried) daughters and Rt is (local) rainfall. The production
function is increasing in its arguments. Because we are interested in the (marriage)
behavior of daughters, we only include the number of daughters in the production
function thereby assuming the number of sons fixed. As mentioned earlier at least
two head of cattle are required for preparing the land for sowing, therefore we
impose qt = 0 if Bt < 2.
A household can use agricultural production to consume ct or to save. Due to
the lack of financial markets households save by extending their stock of cattle.
The amount of consumption is decided after the household learns the production.
Borrowing constraints cause that households can never consume more than the
sum of their production and stock of cattle, i.e. ct ≤ qt + Bt (the price of cattle
in crops is constant over time and normalized to 1). During a period of drought,
farmers can sell some cattle to buy food necessary to survive (see Kinsey, Burger
and Gunning, 1998). Yet because recovering from a period of drought is almost
impossible without any cattle, they are very reluctant to sell cattle. Households
can also accumulate cattle by marrying off a daughter. The marriage decision is
made at the beginning of the period (before producing), but the marriage occurs
at the end of the period (after consuming).2 A household is allowed to marry off
2The rainy season is from the end of November until the beginning of April. This is immedi-
ately followed by the harvest period which takes until June/July. Marriages usually take place
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at most 1 daughter each year. The variable mt takes the value 1 if a daughter
marries in period t and 0 otherwise. For obvious reasons a household can only
marry off a daughter if there are unmarried daughters present, i.e. mt = 0 if
Mt = 0. The number of unmarried daughters in the household evolves according
to Mt+1 =Mt −mt.
The household wealth is expressed by the stock of cattle Bt, which evolves
over time according to the law of motion
Bt+1 = δBt + qt − ct + ptmt + ωt. (1)
The parameter δ represents the growth rate of cattle, which is caused by strength-
ening of cattle, birth, death, aging, etc. One could argue that δ depends on the
amount of rainfall, i.e. in dry years cows lose more weight or die sooner.3 However,
for sake of tractability and simplicity we assume δ to be a constant. The param-
eter pt denotes the amount of bride wealth that is associated with marrying a
daughter. For simplicity, we only take into account the initial payment and ignore
subsequent payments in later periods (we return to this issue in Subsection 5.2).
The amount of bride wealth is decided on the marriage market, so it can change
over time due to covariate (rainfall) shocks. We return to this issue below. Cattle
are subject to several (idiosyncratic) risks, denoted by ωt, such as plagues like
pests and theft. Pests have had devastating effects in the past, but are largely
brought under control. Theft is a regular phenomenon, and can cause serious
problems for the household. The lack of financial markets implies the restriction
Bt ≥ 0.
A household is assumed to exist for T periods and to maximize the expected
present value of lifetime utility
Ut = Et
T∑
τ=t
(1 + r)t−τv(ct),
Households derive utility from consumption ct. The instantaneous utility of a
household is given by v(ct), which is increasing in ct.
4 Future utility is discounted
at rate r.
in the fall.
3Scoones, Chibudu, Chikura, Jeranyama, Machaka, Machanja, Mavedzenge, Mombeshora,
Mudhara, Mudziwo, Murimbarimba and Zirereza (1996) show that in the Chivi region (in
Southern Zimbabwe) after the 1982-1984 droughts the number of households without cattle
more than doubled from 23.3% to 50.7%.
4One may argue that the utility of a households does not only depend on the level of
consumption, but also on the number of family members among which consumption is shared.
Including this would make our model more complicated, but would not change the results.
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The state variables of a household at the beginning of period t are Bt andMt;
cattle and unmarried daughters could be considered as the household’s asset. The
choice variables in this period are ct and mt. In the context of assets, marriages
are used for portfolio diversification. There are two shocks, idiosyncratic (wealth)
shocks ωt and rainfall Rt. Both shocks are independent and identically distributed
over time. For the moment, we assume that rainfall can also be interpreted as an
idiosyncratic shock. In particular, the amount of bride wealth does not depend
on rainfall, but we relax this later on. The model cannot be solved analytically,
therefore we use simulation. We solve the model backwards and follow Keane and
Wolpin (1994), by approximating the value function Ut(Bt,Mt) for each value of
Mt = 0, 1, 2, . . . as a higher order polynomial in Bt. As the marriage decision
is made at the beginning of the period, at each period t, the optimal mt only
depends on the state variables Bt and Mt. The optimal decision of the household
is illustrated in Figure 2. In this figure the optimal marriage strategy is depicted
in the (Mt, Bt)-plane. The region denoted bymt = 0 contains the combinations of
cows and daughters for which it is optimal not to let her marry, while the opposite
holds for the region with mt = 1. In Appendix A we provide the specification
and values of the parameters that gave this figure, but the general picture is not
very sensitive to the choice of the functional forms and values of the parameters.
The figure shows that a household marries off a daughter if the number of
daughters is high relative to the livestock wealth. In the current specification, both
idiosyncratic (wealth) shocks and rainfall shocks affect the number of cattle owned
by the household (one period later). Formal institutions that allow smallholder
farmers to insure against negative shocks do not exist. Therefore, households have
to use alternative ways to deal with negative shocks. Most households do not own
a sufficient amount of cattle to deal with the consequences of negative shocks.
When such a household is hit by a negative shock (in year t− 1), the household
might be pushed from the mt = 0 area to the mt = 1 area. In that case the
household exercises the ‘option value’ of an unmarried daughter to raise the herd
size.
So far, we considered both shocks as idiosyncratic shocks. However, the amount
of rainfall does not vary much spatially, and therefore rainfall shocks are corre-
lated and can have equilibrium effects. In particular, after a period of low rainfall,
many households want to marry off a daughter, while not many households are
willing to pay bride wealth for sons getting married. This reduces the amount of
bride wealth paid by at marriage. We incorporate this in our model by allowing
the amount of bride wealth pt to depend on the rainfall on period earlier Rt−1. In
Figure 3 we again show the optimal marriage decision in the (Bt,Mt)-plane for
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different levels of rainfall Rt−1. It is clear that for a given Bt households are more
likely to marry off a daughter in periods of high rainfall, i.e. the mt = 1 area
is highest for Rt−1 = 0.9. However, low rainfall Rt−1 also reduces the amount of
livestock one period later Bt. Therefore, the effect of low rainfall on marriage is
ambiguous. Depending on the values of the parameters and in particular on how
sensitive the amount of bride wealth is to rainfall, low rainfall can reduce the
willingness of daughters to marry. In the next sections we empirically analyze the
relation between shocks and the age of marriage. We distinguish between idiosyn-
cratic shocks, such as theft and death of cattle, and correlated shocks, such as
a period of drought. The testable implication is that idiosyncratic shocks affect
the marriage behavior of women. After a negative shock households press their
daughters to marry.
3.2 Specification of the statistical model
The theoretical model presented in the previous subsection provided some predic-
tions. In this subsection we present our empirical model, which we use to test these
predictions. We focus on unmarried women and the transition to being married.
We allow this marriage rate to depend on age, some observed characteristics, such
as household size, and covariate (rainfall) shocks and idiosyncratic wealth shocks.
Idiosyncratic wealth shocks are unobserved. We cannot use wealth changes over
years as idiosyncratic wealth shocks as these changes might for example also be
affected by bride wealth payments or rainfall. To construct idiosyncratic wealth
shocks, we use a dynamic model for wealth accumulation discussed in subsubsec-
tion 3.2.2. But first, we discuss the specification of the marriage rate.
3.2.1 The marriage rate
It is useful to start with a brief outline of our data and to provide some charac-
teristics of the data that are relevant for the model. A more elaborate discussion
of the data is given in the next section. The database includes unmarried women,
who are interviewed yearly. At the moment of the interview the women are asked
about their marital status and age. Additionally, a number of household char-
acteristics are collected. This allows us to construct spells of being unmarried,
although we do not observe the exact date of marriage and the date of birth,
but only the years. Some women are still unmarried at the end of the obser-
vation period, and some other women left the database unmarried, for example
because they temporarily moved to relatives. Such spells of being unmarried are
right-censored, which we treat as exogenous.
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We want to avoid initial conditions problems. Therefore, we construct a flow
sample that only contains women who are observed from the moment they reach
the age at which they start getting married. It is clear that it is not necessary
to observe women from the moment of birth: it is sufficient to follow them from
the age they start marrying. We set the minimum age of marrying at 15, which
is denoted by t0. This minimum age is not due to legal restrictions, but reflects
the age the statistical bureau of Zimbabwe uses as lower bound for the age at
marriage. Of the women born between 1975 and 1980 less than 3 percent was
reported to be married by the age of 15 (Central Statistical Office, 1995). This is
also confirmed by our data, which does not show any marriages of women under
age 15. Since the flow sample only includes women reaching age 15 during the
observation period, the cost of avoiding initial condition problems is ignoring a
large share of the available data. However, the great benefit is that we do not
have to make stationarity assumptions (see Ridder, 1984).
Age and calendar time are genuinely continuous, but we only observe in which
year a woman got married. To deal with this discrepancy, we use an underlying
continuous-time marriage rate to model the probability that an unmarried woman
of age t ≥ t0 at calendar time τ marries before calendar time τ + 1. Since we
do not observe the exact date of birth, but only the age at the moment of the
interview, we integrate over the possible dates of birth. We assume that the
differences in transition rate from unmarried to married can be characterized a
vector of observed characteristics xτ (for example household size and rainfall in
year τ), unobserved individual characteristics v and the elapsed duration of being
unmarried t (age of the unmarried woman). We assume v to be independent of xτ
and τ . The unobserved characteristics are individual specific and not household
specific. Changes over time in xτ are assumed to be exogenous and unpredictable.
The marriage rate at age t conditional on xτ and v is denoted by λ(t|xτ , v) and
is assumed to have the familiar Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) specification
λ(t|xτ , v) = ψ(t) exp(xτβ + v),
in which ψ(t) is a positive function representing the baseline hazard or age de-
pendence. Let t be the actual age when getting married and τ0 the calendar time
at birth. The conditional density function of t|xτ0+t0 , . . . , xτ0+t, v can be written
as
f(t|xτ0+t0 , . . . , xτ0+t, v) = λ(t|xτ0+t, v) exp
(
−
∫ t
t0
λ(s|xτ0+s, v)ds
)
, t ≥ t0.
The conditional survivor function of t|τ0, x, v, i.e. the conditional probability that
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the duration of being unmarried exceeds t, equals
S(t|xτ0+t0 , . . . , xτ0+t, v) = exp
(
−
∫ t
t0
λ(s|xτ0+s, v)ds
)
, t ≥ t0.
Obviously, S(t|xτ0+t0 , . . . , xτ0+t, v) = 1 if t < t0.
Note that in the model we treat each woman as an independent observation.
This is not completely correct as some women live as sisters in the same house-
hold. For a household with only few head of cattle, one of the daughters getting
married can be sufficient to avoid future poverty, implying dependency between
the marriage rates of sisters. In particular the marriage rates between sisters are
likely to be negatively correlated. It also implies that by treating sisters as inde-
pendent, we underestimate the effect of household’s economic conditions on the
marriage rate. We do not correct for this. The parameters we estimate are no
policy parameters and therefore we are more interested in their signs rather than
their exact values.
We have to integrate over yearly intervals in which women reached age 15
and got married. Let T be the stochastic variable denoting the date at which a
woman gets married. Conditional on the year of inflow in the sample τ0 + t0, i.e.
the year in which the women became 15 and the vectors of explanatory variables
xτ , τ = τ0+ t0, τ0+ t0+1, . . ., the probability of getting married between year τ
∗
and τ ∗ + 1 equals
Pr(T ∈ [τ ∗, τ ∗ + 1)|xτ0+t0 , . . . , xτ∗)
=
∫ τ∗−τ0+t0+1
τ∗−τ0+t0
∫ t0+1
t0
∫
v
f(r + p|τ0 + t0 − p, xτ0+t0 , . . . , xτ∗ , v)dG(v)dpdr
where G(v) is the distribution function of the unobserved characteristic v. The
individual contributions to the loglikelihood function are based on this distribu-
tion function. Within this hazard rate framework right-censoring, i.e. a woman is
still unmarried at the end of the observation period, is solved in a straightforward
manner.
For the baseline hazard function, ψ(t), and the unobserved heterogeneity dis-
tribution, G(v), we take the most flexible specifications used to date. We take
ψ(t) to have a piecewise constant specification,
ψ(t) = exp
( ∑
j=1,2,...
λjIj (t)
)
,
where j is a subscript denoting time intervals and Ij(t) are time-varying dummy
variables that are equal to one in consecutive time intervals. Note that with an
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increasing number of time intervals any pattern can be approximated arbitrarily
closely. We take these time intervals equal to two years.
We take the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity G(v) to be a discrete
distribution with a fixed number of unrestricted mass point locations. Let vi,
i = 1, . . . ,m be the points of support and let pi, i = 1, . . . ,m be the associated
probabilities, i.e. pi = Pr(v = vi), where 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, i,= 1, . . . ,m and pm =
1 − p1 − . . . − pm−1. Note that discrete distributions are advantageous not only
from the point of flexibility but also from a computational point of view.
3.2.2 Idiosyncratic wealth shocks
The theoretical model stressed the relation between the household’s livestock
wealth and marriage decisions. There are some disadvantages to taking house-
hold’s livestock wealth as regressor in the model. Households may differ in their
preferences (instantaneous utility function or discount rate) or production func-
tion (land quality or available equipment), and therefore there can be households
that are always poor or households that are always rich. Girls from poorer house-
holds may prefer to marry younger for instance because living in a poor house-
hold is not very pleasant. Therefore, we want to distinguish between a household’s
livestock wealth level and idiosyncratic shocks in the household’s livestock wealth
level. To get an indication on how big shocks in household wealth are compared
to the distribution of wealth between the households, we compare the average
standard deviation of livestock wealth of households (over the years) with the
standard deviation of average wealth of households (over the years). The average
value of livestock is around 11.7 cows, the average standard deviation of household
livestock wealth 3.3 cows and the standard deviation of average wealth of house-
holds 8.9 cows. This implies that there are indeed generally richer and poorer
households, but being rich in one particular year does not guarantee being rich in
the next year. In general, we see that the average livestock wealth of households
is increasing during the observation period as households are recovering from the
drought in 1991/1992.
For obvious reasons idiosyncratic shocks in the households livestock wealth
are nor directly observed in the data. We cannot simply take the idiosyncratic
shocks equal to difference in livestock wealth in a particular year compared to
the average during the observation period. If a marriage occurs the bride wealth
payments increase the mean household’s livestock wealth, which implies that
before the moment of the marriage the shock would be too low and after the
moment of marriage too high. This might cause spurious relations between shocks
and the marriage rate. Similar problems arise if we would define the shock as the
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difference in livestock wealth in subsequent years. Therefore, to construct shocks
in household’s livestock wealth (and the household’s livestock wealth level), we
estimate a dynamic panel data model for livestock wealth accumulation (that
also takes marriages and rainfall shocks into account). First, we provide and
estimate the model for livestock wealth accumulation and next we discuss how
these estimation results are used in estimating the marriage rate (details are
provided in Appendix B).
Our data set contains information on H households that are denoted by
h = 1, . . . , H. The panel is unbalanced, however, the number of years Th for
which we observe household h is exogenous. The theoretical model predicts that
the household’s livestock wealthBh,t (measured in cows) depends on (i) the house-
hold’s livestock wealth one year earlier Bh,t−1, (ii) a dummy variable mh,t that
indicates if a daughter in the household married between the survey in year t− 1
and year t,5 (iii) the size of the household Sh,t−1 during the survey in year t− 1,
(iv) the amount of rainfall Rt−1 in year t−1, and (v) some household characteris-
tics zh that are constant over time. These latter household characteristics include
region, faith and living in a single-headed household.
The household’s livestock wealth accumulates according to the model
Bh,t = β0 + β1Bh,t−1 + β2mh,t + β3Sh,t−1 + β4Rt−1 + zhβ5 + ηh + εh,t,
where ηh is an unobserved household specific wealth component and εh,t are id-
iosyncratic wealth shocks. These are the two components that we want to include
as regressors in the marriage rate. This model for livestock wealth accumulation
can be interpreted as the reduced-form of equation (1) in the theoretical model.
The marriage rate is specified at the level of daughters instead of households.
Woman i = 1, . . . , N lives in a household with household specific effect ηi and
yearly shocks are εi,1, . . . , εi,T . The characteristics of the women are given by
xi,τ , where τ denotes the year in which these are observed. As shown above the
likelihood function equals
N∏
i=1
Pr(T ∈ [τ ∗i , τ ∗i + 1)|xτ0,i+t0 , . . . , xτ∗i , ηi, εi,τ0,i+to , . . . , εi,τ∗i )
If we would know the values of ηi and εi,τ , we could just optimize the logarithm
of this likelihood function to obtain the parameter estimates. However, instead
5As mentioned earlier not all bride wealth is paid in the year of marriage, which might
suggest that we should also include the dummy variables for marriages lagged. However, bride
wealth payments are most substantial in the year of marriage and bride wealth payment schemes
are not similar. Furthermore, we do not observe marriages occurring before 1994, so including
these lagged variable would reduce the length of our panel considerably.
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of ηi and εi,τ we observe the estimated residuals vˆi,τ (see for details Appendix B).
Therefore we optimize the loglikelihood function
log
(∫ N∏
i=1
Pr(T ∈ [τ ∗i , τ ∗i + 1)|xτ0,i+t0 , . . . , xτ∗i , ηi, εi,τ0,i+t0 , . . . , εi,τ∗i )f(η, ε|vˆ) d(η, ε)
)
where η is a vector containing all household specific effects, ε is a matrix contain-
ing for all households all yearly shocks and vˆ is a matrix containing the estimated
residuals vˆh,t. In Appendix B we provide in detail the derivation of the density
function f(η, ε|vˆ).
To optimize the loglikelihood function given above we use simulated maximum
likelihood estimation (e.g. Stern, 1997). We draw 1000 times from the distribution
f(η, ε|vˆ). For each draw j = 1, . . . , 1000 we follow procedure: (i) given the values
vˆ we generate a matrix vj, (ii) we generate a vector ηj with household specific
effects from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σˆ2η, (iii) we compute
the matrix of shocks εj = vj − ηj, (iv) we compute the individual likelihood
contribution, (v) we sum the logarithm of the individual likelihood contributions
and maximize this sum.
4 Data
The data set we use is a yearly panel of Zimbabwean smallholder farmers cover-
ing the period 1994 until 2000.6 These households belong to the group of about
25,000 families that have been resettled in the early 1980s on land acquired from
large-scale farmers after the independence. Approximately 400 households are
interviewed, living in three different regions (Mpfurudzi, Sengezi and Mutanda).
These schemes were chosen to ensure representation of each of the three major
agro-ecological zones in the country which are suited for cropping. Farmers lo-
cated in Mpfurudzi live in the area most favorable to farming, those in Mutanda
have to deal with the worst conditions. Those resettled in Sengezi live in an
intermediate area.
The data are collected by Bill Kinsey and are described in more detail in
Kinsey, Burger and Gunning (1998). The interviews take place in the beginning
of the year, and thus describe the previous year. Starting in 1994 information on
all household members is collected along with household level variables (whereas
6The data also includes the survey for 2001. However, we decided not to use this information
because starting in 2000 large changes took place in Zimbabwe, especially in the political
situation regarding land reform.
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the 1993 interview only collected household level information). At the household
level variables such as crop income and livestock possession are administered. The
questions to the individuals are about age, level of education, gender, marital sta-
tus, etc. If an individual is not present at the time of the survey, but was recorded
as a household member in a previous survey, the reason is asked why the individ-
ual left the household. Women generally leave the household upon marriage. So
by comparing presence in the household and marital status in consecutive years,
it is possible to construct spells of being unmarried.7
Since we are interested in the marriage behavior of young women, we only
use the subset of the data consisting of all unmarried women whose age exceeds
15 years at some interview. Furthermore, we restrict the subsample to women
under the age 30, as older unmarried women are often divorced or widowed. In
total we observe 691 unmarried women over the age 15, of which in total 233
got married during the observation period. We refer to this sample as the stock
sample. The empirical marriage rate is shown in Figure 4. It reflects an increasing
pattern until age 21. After that the empirical marriage rate fluctuates, but there
is no clear trend. Figure 5 shows the corresponding Kaplan-Meier estimates of
the survival probabilities, i.e. the probability that a woman is still unmarried at
a particular age. Most women marry before age 30, only 4% is still unmarried
at this age. At age 22 over 60% of the women has got married. The median age
of marrying in our data is around 21 years and thus higher than the median
marriage age in Zimbabwe, which is 19 years (see Section 2). Remember that our
data describe a very specific rural area, where the (resettlement) farmers are on
average somewhat richer than other farmers.
In Table 1 we present some annual statistics of the data, such as the number
of marriages, the average marital age and both local and average rainfall in Zim-
babwe.8 We have stratified the sample by the region in which the women live. For
each of the three regions both the number of marriages and the average age of
marriage decrease over the years. Also the sample size decreases over the years.
This is caused by the original sampling of the data, which includes households
of which the man was between 35 and 50 years old in 1982.9 This implies that
more women leave the sample (for reason of marriage), than young (unmarried)
7Generally daughters do not leave the household for reasons other than marriage. Sons are
much more likely to leave the household unmarried to seek employment in town and get married
while they are in town. This makes it more difficult to focus on the marriage behavior of sons.
8The local rainfall data and the Zimbabwean rainfall data are collected by the Department
of Meteorological Services in Zimbabwe.
9A family remains in the data until both the man and woman die. After that this household
is replaced by the people who move into their house (most likely sons or daughters).
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women enter the sample (because they reach age 15). Local rainfall is correlated
with average rainfall in Zimbabwe, but there is variation between the regions. In
each of the regions rainfall was lowest in 1994/1995, which affects the marriage
in the Fall of 1995. The data do not show strong differences in the number of
marriages and the average age of marriage between the years with a large and
low amount of rainfall.
Table 2 provides the average marriage age stratified by the year of marriage
and the herd size of the household. In most years, daughters in the less wealthy
families marry younger than in the wealthier families. However, the differences
are not very pronounced.
By constructing a flow sample (ref. Section 3.2.1 we restrict the data further
to all women who reached age 15 during the observation period. This gives a
sample of 333 women (originating from 302 different households), of which 57 got
married during the observation period. Table 4 shows the number of women in
the flow sample at the beginning of a year and the number of marriages in that
year. Because the sample size is relatively small we do not stratify by region. It
is clear from the table that most marriages occur in the last three years of the
observation period. During the first three years, the women in the flow sample
are all younger than 18 years. The marriage rate for this age group is low (as can
be seen from the empirical marriage rate in Figure 4).
In Table 5 we show the average livestock wealth in each year for the subsam-
ple of women who got married in that year and those who remained unmarried.
We see that in each year except for 1999, the women who got married came from
poorer households. Recall that in the first three years the number of marriages was
very low. The difference in wealth between the subsamples is particularly large in
1998, which was a year following the relative dry year 1997. This seems to con-
firm that after a negative shock women in poor households are more likely to get
married. But we cannot rule out that that there are households that are always
poor and households that are always rich and that girls from poorer households
prefer to marry younger. On average the women in our sample live in a house-
hold containing around 12 persons (including the parents). Another variable we
include is an indicator for being the oldest unmarried daughter in the household.
If the timing of a marriage is indeed a household decision, a (temporarily) poor
household will most likely put pressure on the oldest unmarried daughter to get
married. Furthermore, we use region and faith as explanatory variables. Most
women in the sample live in villages in Mpfurudzi. In terms of religious denomi-
nation around 17% of the women reports to have African faith and 7% Masowe
faith. The remaining women mostly have Christian faith, which is generally less
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strict than the African and Masowe faith. For around 11% of the women house-
hold characteristics are missing, we include a dummy variable for these women.
In 17% of the cases the father is missing in the household and in 2% the mother.
The data contain some information on the amount of bride wealth paid (and
especially on the amount of danga, i.e. the most substation payment related to
the rights over children, see Section 2). This variable needs to be interpreted with
care. The information on bride wealth paid is affected by item non-response, and
bride wealth paid is only observed at the household level, as the total amount of
bride wealth obtained in the previous year. It is thus not related to a particular
marriage. By combining the individual data on marriages with the household data
on bride wealth, we relate bride wealth to marriages. In particular, if we observe
the household receiving bride wealth we link this to the most recent marriage that
occurred in this household. For the year 2000 we did not obtain any information
on bride wealth.
On the basis of the bride wealth data, we create two variables. The first
variable contains the amount of bride wealth received by the household in the year
of marriage, which we refer to as short-term bride wealth. The second variable,
which is called long-term bride wealth is the accumulated amount of bride wealth
received by the household in the year of marriage and the following years in the
observation period. However, recall that it usually takes around 30 years until
the total amount of bride wealth has been paid, while we only observe yearly
payments over a maximum of 5 years. The total amount of bride wealth we
observe is therefore an underestimate of the actual total amount. We restrict
our attention to households for which we observe household characteristics. For
these households we observe 424 marriages in the data. However, we only find
bride wealth information for 128 of them. In the sample the average bride wealth
consisted of around 1300 Zimbabwean dollars (either in cash or in cattle).
With respect to long-term bride wealth we only include marriages until 1997,
otherwise the total observed bride wealth would be too much affected by the
remaining length of the observation period after the year of marriage. This sub-
sample includes 174 marriages. For 156 of these 174 we observe bride wealth. The
average bride wealth was approximately 2200 Zimbabwean dollar.
5 Estimation results
In this section we present the estimation results of the empirical analyses. We
first discuss the estimation results for the marriage rate. After that we consider
estimation results concerning the amount of bride wealth.
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5.1 Estimation results for the marriage rate
The parameter estimates of the flow sample procedure are presented in Table 6.
We do not find any significant unobserved heterogeneity. During the optimization
of the loglikelihood function both mass points converge to a single mass point. The
baseline hazard shows how the marriage rate is affected by the age of an unmarried
woman. It shows that the marriage rate increases with age. The marriage rate
is highest for women living in Mpfurundi. The women in the other regions on
average marry later. Women with African faith marry later than women with
Masowe faith or Christian faith.
One of the parameters of interest is the effect of the amount of rainfall on
the marriage rate. Our theoretical model showed that the effect of rainfall on
marriages could either be positive or negative, depending on the sensitivity of
the amount of bride wealth on rainfall. The estimates show that the effect of
rainfall on the marriage rate is positive (but not significantly different from 0),
implying that more marriages occur after a season with more rainfall. During the
observation period the quantity of rainfall varied from around 0.5 meter in 1994
to around 1 meter in 1996 and 1998, which implies that in 1999 the marriage rate
was on average only around 38% higher than in 1995, i.e. exp(0.64 · 0.5) − 1 ≈
0.38. As mentioned before local rainfall is correlated with the average rainfall
in Zimbabwe (e.g. Table 1). The effect of the amount of rainfall in this case is
thus merely a marriage market effect. Like brides (and their families) grooms
suffer from the negative weather shocks as well. After a drought they are likely
to be reluctant to get married and to pay bride wealth. So even if households
put pressure on their daughters to get married after a dry season, the number
of marriages might increase little because of the unavailability of grooms. The
reduction in the number of marriages after a period of low rainfall, implies that
rainfall must have a negative effect on the amount of bride wealth. We return to
this issue in the next subsection.
The effect of being the oldest unmarried daughter in the household is positive.
The marriage rate of the oldest daughter is 67% (= exp(0.51) − 1) higher than
the marriage of a girl of the same age, who has an older unmarried sister. This
is in agreement with the hypothesis that the timing of marriage is a household
decision rather than an individual decision. In case a household would like one of
their daughters to get married, the oldest daughter is most likely to be pressed to
do so. There are two main reasons for this. First, the amount of bride wealth is
decreasing faster in age for older girls (if a women marries at young age, she will
most likely have more children). So, the opportunity costs of staying unmarried
for some period are highest for the oldest daughter in the household. Second,
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other daughters could easily argue against the parents’ pressure to marry on the
ground that they have an older unmarried sister. Since the model takes account
of the age of women, this is not a spurious effect due to the fact that the average
age of oldest daughters is most likely to be higher than of the other unmarried
women.
As predicted by our theoretical model, the size of the household has a signifi-
cant positive effect on the marriage rate, implying that daughters living in larger
households marry on average younger. In larger households the loss of labor due
to a marriage is less severe, the marginal productivity of a daughter in larger
households is smaller than in smaller households. Alternatively, large households
are likely to have many sons, which are (due to bride wealth) claims on house-
hold wealth. Ideally, the marriage of a daughter precedes the marriage of a son,
and thus women living in households with many brothers have more pressure to
marry. Therefore, we have tried to replace household size with the number of sons
in the household. This did not affect the parameter estimate. Both variables are
too correlated to include them jointly.
The effect of living in a single-headed household is positive which suggests that
women in single-headed households marry earlier. We do not know the reason
why a parent is absent, but recall that the father is much more often absent
than the mother, in 17% and 2% of the households respectively. A father who is
absent may work in the city, although as noted earlier finding work in the city
is difficult. If the father is absent because of work in the city, the yearly income
of the household is likely to be more stable. Therefore, household behavior is
less sensitive to shocks and their need for cattle (as buffer stock) is reduced. The
latter corresponds to the empirical fact that single-headed households are less
well endowed with livestock than two-parent households, their livestock wealth is
about 20% lower. If the father works in the city, the household is less dependent
on the income from agriculture, which means that the household does not need
the labor of the children (although it might be that in single-headed households
children have to perform (part of) the tasks of the missing parent). This lowers
the marginal productivity of a child in a single-headed family, and therefore the
girls marry at a younger age.
The last regressors in the model describe livestock wealth in the household.
The effect of a idiosyncratic shocks on livestock wealth εi,t is more important than
differences between household specific components ηi. After a negative shock in
the household’s livestock wealth, the marriage rate increases significantly. If a
household loses 2 head of cattle, due to an unanticipated event such as theft, the
marriage rate of daughters in this household increases with around 22%. This is
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in agreement with the theoretical model. The covariate effect of the household
specific wealth component ηi is also negative, but not significant. Women from less
wealthy households marry at a younger age than women from richer households.
Daughters living in poor household have a strong incentive to leave the household,
just to escape bad living conditions.
We have tried adding other explanatory variables to the model. However, this
did not improve the fit, i.e. the parameter estimates were very close to 0 with
relatively large standard errors and no improvement in the loglikelihood function.
In particular, we added equipment owned by the household and total acres of
land used in agricultural production. It should be stressed that these variables
are highly correlated with livestock wealth, which implies that potential covariate
effects of such regressors are already covered by livestock wealth.
5.2 Analyzing the amount of bride wealth payments
Finally, we performed some empirical analyses on the amount of the bride wealth.
As mentioned in Section 4 the data on the amount of the bride wealth are not
very precise and do not cover a sufficiently long period to observe the payment
of total bride wealth as payments most often take as much as 30 years. We only
observe the total amount of bride wealth received in a particular year, which we
link to the most recent marriage in the household. This is a strong assumption
and therefore the estimation results should be interpreted with care. For the
empirical analyses we use tobit models.10 We perform two analyses, the first
based on the amount of bride wealth received during the year of marriage and
the second based on the accumulated amount of bride wealth received during the
observation period after the marriage. The latter also includes the bride wealth
10Since we only observe the amount of bride wealth for a subsample of the data, the ideal
model would be a sample selection model. However, identification of sample selection models
hinges on exclusion restrictions. In our data there is no variable that would qualify for being
excluded from the equation denoting the amount of bride wealth, but included in the equation
describing if the household reports having received bride wealth. Therefore, we use a simpler
censored regression or tobit model,
y∗ = xβ + ε
and
y =
{
y∗ if y∗ > 0
0 if y∗ ≤ 0
The interpretation of this model is that bride wealth is observed with a large measurement error
ε, and that households only report having received bride wealth if the bride wealth including
the measurement error exceeds 0.
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received in the year of marriage. As explanatory variables we include age of the
daughter at the moment of marriage, amount of rainfall, an indicator for being
the oldest daughter and livestock wealth in the year before marriage.
The estimation results are given in Table 7. Except for rainfall all covariate
effects on the amount of bride wealth received in the year of marriage, are opposite
to the effect on the total amount of the bride wealth. Obviously, some households
prefer a relatively large amount of bride wealth at the moment of marriage over
a larger over-all amount of bride wealth. The amount of bride wealth received at
the first year is higher in relatively dry years, for poorer households and if it is
the oldest daughter who marries. Above we already explained that since we also
correct for age, the dummy variable for oldest daughter can be interpreted as an
indicator for household pressure. It is clear that households who bargain for a
relatively large initial payment of bride wealth, have to accept low payments in
the following years. This observation is in accordance with our theoretical model,
poor households need sufficient cattle for agricultural production. Therefore, they
need a substantial initial transfer, which is obviously followed by a period with
low transfers follows.
Even though very insignificant, the effect of rainfall on the amount of bride
wealth seems to contradict our theoretical model. We would expect that after
periods of low rainfall, bride wealth payment would be lower, the estimation
results show the opposite. Recall that we found that the marriage rate decreased
in periods of low rainfall. Those marriages that actually take place after a period
of low rainfall might therefore be selective, the groom should come from a wealthy
family as this family is capable of paying bride wealth after a period of low rainfall.
The empirical result can be explained if people from relatively wealthy families
mostly marry people from wealthy families and these marriages involve larger
amounts of bride wealth.
6 Conclusions
This paper focuses on the timing of marriage in rural areas in Zimbabwe. In
these rural areas farmers live who obtained 12 acres of land from a resettlement
program in the early 1980s. To work the land cattle is required; without cattle
agricultural production is minimal. The absence of access to formal financial
institutions to smallholder farmers causes that households cannot borrow to buy
cattle if they do not possess sufficient cattle for plowing. Since finding off-farm
jobs is extremely difficult and the return to manually working the fields is low,
households without cattle may get stuck in poverty for a long period. Due to the
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existence of bride wealth, which is a transfer from (the family of) the groom to
the family of the bride, a daughter’s marriage is a possibility to acquire cattle.
An unmarried daughter could therefore be considered as an asset that can be
cashed in bad times.
To guide interpretation for the empirical analyses, we have developed a dy-
namic model for the household behavior of Zimbabwean smallholder farmers. In
particular, we have considered the effects of household size, livestock wealth and
covariate and idiosyncratic shocks on marriage behavior. In the empirical analy-
sis we focus on the influence of weather shocks and (shocks to) household cattle
wealth on the timing of a daughter’s marriage. For the empirical analyses we rely
on a unique panel data set on Zimbabwean smallholder farmers. In the data we
find that the wealth of these smallholder farmers fluctuates enormously over the
years, i.e. being wealthy in a particular does not guarantee being wealthy in next
years. If indeed the marriage behavior depends on shocks, the composition of
the population of unmarried women in a year depends on shocks in the previous
years. To take account of these dynamics, we use a mixed proportional hazard
rate framework to model the age of marriage.
By focusing on the timing of a marriage of a daughter, we only provide a
partial picture on the marriage market. However, the lack of information on the
choice of spouses makes it impossible to extend this picture.
The estimation results show that the amount of rainfall has a positive effect
on the marriage rate, which is most likely a marriage market effect, i.e. after a
period of low rainfall the supply of men is lower as not that many households
are capable of paying bride wealth. The marriage rate of daughters is higher for
poorer households. In particular, after a negative shock in livestock wealth the
marriage rate of daughters increases. Furthermore, the marriage rate for the oldest
daughter in the household is higher. Both these effects confirm the hypothesis
that households use an unmarried daughter as an asset that can be cashed in
bad times. The marriage decision should therefore not only be considered as a
decision of the individuals involved, but also as a household decision.
We also considered the amount of bride wealth. These estimation results pro-
vide additional evidence that the timing of marriage is used as means to avoid
getting stuck in poverty. In particular, less wealthy households receive a larger
initial payment at the moment a daughter gets married. The accumulated amount
of bride wealth they receive in the first years of marriage is relatively low, so that
the relatively high initial payment goes at the expense of subsequent payments.
In other words, a period of poverty is only avoided at the expense of receiving
lower payments in the subsequent years.
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Our results have policy relevance. In particular, the use of marriage as an
alternative financial institution affects the age at which daughters marry. This
might have negative external effects. If women marry young, they are more likely
to have more children. Furthermore, households might want to have at least
a particular number of daughters to act as insurance against negative shocks.
Relatively large household have less resources per child to invest in health and
schooling of children. Especially, girls will suffer as they are pressed to marry
young. This may cause poverty to be transmitted across generations.
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A Parameterization of the theoretical model
For the simulation of our theoretical model, we used the following specification of
the model. The planning horizon T of a household equals 14 years. This can be
interpreted as the period that a household with unmarried daughters can exist,
i.e. the period a family can decide on whether or not to marry off a daughter. The
production function of the household qt = f(Bt,Mt, Rt, ) follows a Cobb-Douglas
specification:
qt = I(Bt ≥ 2)0.5B0.5t (Mt + 4)0.5R2t
Because Mt denotes the number of daughters, we take total labor input to be
equal to Mt + 4, representing the parents and other family members (sons) in-
volved in production. The stochastic variable representing rainfall Rt is uniformly
distributed on the interval [0.6,1].
We take the instant utility function to be of the CRRA type and the house-
hold’s discount rate is 0.2, so that lifetime utility equals
Ut =
14∑
τ=t
(1 + 0.2)t−τ
1
1− 0.5c
1−0.5
t
The depreciation rate of cattle is set to 0.95. We have used two specification for
the amount of bride wealth. In the first specification the amount of bride wealth
does not vary over time and equals 3 head of cattle. In the second specification the
amount of bride wealth depends on the rainfall in the previous year, in particular
pt = 2 + 5(Rt−1 − 0.6). Finally, the idiosyncratic shock is normally distributed
with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.5.
In the simulation study we used polynomials to approximate Ut(Bt,Mt). At
each point in time t, for each Mt = 0, 1, . . . we used a fourth order polynomial in
Bt to approximate Ut(Bt,Mt). Both higher and lower order polynomials gave a
worse fit for extreme values of Bt and Mt. For the model specification where the
amount of bride wealth depends on rainfall in the previous period, Rt−1 also is
a state variable. Therefore, we had to approximate Ut(Bt,Mt, Rt−1). We used for
each t and each Mt = 0, 1, . . . a polynomial of order 4 in Bt, of order 3 in Rt−1
and with 1 interaction term between Bt and Rt.
We have done sensitivity analyses with respect to the parameterization. In-
creasing the variance of the idiosyncratic (wealth) shocks shifts the border be-
tween the mt = 0 and the mt = 1 areas to the left, increased uncertainty leads
to more marriages at a given livestock wealth.
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B Estimating the marriage rate including id-
iosyncratic wealth shocks as regressors
In this appendix we provide the details of estimating the marriage rate that in-
cludes a fixed household component for livestock wealth and a component that
describes idiosyncratic shocks in the household’s livestock wealth. The house-
hold’s livestock wealth accumulates according
Bh,t = β0 + β1Bh,t−1 + β2mh,t + β3Sh,t−1 + β4Rt−1 + zhβ5 + ηh + εh,t,
where ηh is an unobserved household specific wealth component and εh,t are
random shocks. We assume that both ηh and εh,t follow a normal distribution
with mean zero and variance σ2η and σ
2
ε respectively.
The household specific wealth component ηh is not independent of Bh,t−1. To
get rid of ηh, we take first differences,
∆Bh,t = β1∆Bh,t−1 + β2∆mh,t + β3∆Sh,t−1 + β4∆Rt−1 +∆εh,t
However, the new regressor ∆Bh,t−1 obtained after the transformation is corre-
lated with the error term ∆εh,t (as Bh,t−1 depends on εh,t−1). Also marriage mh,t
might depend on shocks in household’s livestock wealth one year earlier, which
suggests that mh,t can be correlated with εh,t−1. Therefore, we will use two-stage
least squares (2SLS) to estimate the model, where in the first stage we estimate
∆Bh,t−1 = γ0 + γ1Bh,t−2 + γ2Bh,t−3 + γ3mh,t−1 + γ4∆Sh,t−1 + γ5∆Sh,t−2
+ γ6∆Rt−1 + γ7∆Rt−2 + u1h,t
∆mh,t = δ0 + δ1Bh,t−2 + δ2Bh,t−3 + δ3mh,t−1 + δ4∆Sh,t−1 + δ5∆Sh,t−2
+ δ6∆Rt−1 + δ7∆Rt−2 + u2h,t
This 2SLS procedure provides consistent estimators βˆ1, βˆ2 and βˆ3 (as H →∞).11
As an estimator for σ2ε , we use
σˆ2ε =
1
H
H∑
h=1
1
Th − 1
Th∑
t=1
(
uˆh,t − 1
Th
Th∑
t=1
uˆh,t
)2
where
uˆh,t = Bh,t − βˆ1Bh,t−1 − βˆ2mh,t − βˆ3Sh,t−1 − βˆ4Rt−1
11We have performed a Sargan-test to test the specification of our model and the validity of
the set of instrumental variables. The value of the test statistics equals 4.51. Since it follows a
χ2-distribution with 3 degrees of freedom, we cannot reject that the model is misspecified or
that the instrumental variables are invalid.
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When computing the standard errors for βˆ1, βˆ2, βˆ3 and βˆ4 we have corrected
for correlation between ∆εh,t and ∆εh,t−1, i.e. cov(∆εh,t−1,∆εh,t) = −σ2ε and
var(∆εh,t) = 2σ
2
ε . The estimation results are given in Table 8.
Next, we estimate the parameters β0 and β5. Therefore, we use the regression
1
Th
Th∑
t=1
uˆh,t = β0 + zhβ5 + eh
where it can be shown that
eh = ηh +
1
Th
Th∑
t=1
εh,t +
1
Th
Th∑
t=1
(β1 − βˆ1)Bh,t−1 + (β2 − βˆ2)mh,t
+ (β3 − βˆ3)Sh,t−1 + (β4 − βˆ4)Rt−1
We can use OLS to estimate the parameters β0 and β5, but when computing stan-
dard errors we should take into account that the disturbances eh are all correlated
with each other and that they suffer from heteroskedasticity. The estimation re-
sults are reported in Table 9.
As will become clear below, we need to know the complete variance-covariance
matrix of
[
βˆ0; βˆ
′
5
]′
and
[
βˆ1; βˆ2; βˆ3; βˆ4
]′
. This implies that we also should es-
timate the covariance matrix of the estimators
[
βˆ0; βˆ
′
5
]′
with the estimators[
βˆ1; βˆ2; βˆ3; βˆ4
]′
. We know that
[
βˆ0 − β0
βˆ5 − β5
]
=
(
[ι;Z]′ [ι;Z]
)−1
[ι;Z]′
 e1...
eH

where ι is a vector containing 1s and Z is a matrix with the vectors zh. As we know
how eh depends on βˆ1, βˆ2, βˆ3, and βˆ4, we get an expression for the covariance ma-
trix between
[
βˆ0; βˆ
′
5
]′
and
[
βˆ1; βˆ2; βˆ3; βˆ4
]′
. Let the estimated variance-covariance
matrix of the estimators
[
βˆ0; βˆ1; βˆ2; βˆ3; βˆ
′
4; βˆ5
]′
be given by Ωˆ.
The marriage rate is specified at the level of daughters instead of households.
Woman i = 1, . . . , N lives in a household with household specific effect ηi and
yearly shocks are εi,1, . . . , εi,T . However, ηi and εi,τ are unobserved, instead we
observe the estimated residual
vˆh,t = wh,t − βˆ0 − βˆ1wh,t−1 − βˆ2mh,t − βˆ3xh,t−1 − βˆ4rt−1 − zhβˆ5
29
We should therefore optimize the loglikelihood function
log
(∫ N∏
i=1
Pr(T ∈ [τ ∗i , τ ∗i + 1)|xτ0,i+t0 , . . . , xτ∗i , ηi, εi,τ0,i+t0 , . . . , εi,τ∗i )f(η, ε|vˆ) d(η, ε)
)
where η is a vector containing all household specific effects, ε is a matrix contain-
ing for all households all yearly shocks and vˆ is a matrix containing the estimated
residuals vˆh,t.
The remaining problem is to specify the density function f(η, ε|vˆ). We rewrite
this density function by conditioning on a matrix v containing the elements vh,t =
ηh + εh,t, as
f(η, ε|vˆ) =
∫
f(η, ε|v, vˆ)f(v|vˆ)dv
It is clear that if we know v, then vˆ is not informative about η and ε, thus
f(η, ε|v, vˆ) = f(η, ε|v)
This density function can be written as
f(η, ε|v) =
H∏
h=1
f(ηh, εh,1 . . . , εh,Th|vh,1, . . . , vh,Th)
∝
H∏
h=1
f(vh,1, . . . , vh,Th |ηh, εh,1, . . . , εh,Th)f(ηh, εh,1, . . . , εh,Th)
=
H∏
h=1
φ(ηh)
Th∏
t=1
I(εh,t = vh,t − ηh)φ(εh,t)
where I(·) is the indicator function. In the last step we used that both ηi and εi,t
follow normal distributions (as was assumed earlier).
Next we have to focus on f(v|vˆ). Note that
vh,t = Bh,t − β0 − β1Bh,t−1 − β2mh,t − β3Sh,t−1 − β4Rt−1 − zhβ5
= βˆ0 + βˆ1Bh,t−1 + βˆ2mh,t + βˆ3Sh,t−1 + βˆ4Rt−1 + zhβˆ5 + vˆh,t
− β0 − β1Bh,t−1 − β2mh,t − β3Sh,t−1 − β4Rt−1 − zhβ5
= (βˆ0 − β0) + (βˆ1 − β1)Bh,t−1 + (βˆ2 − β2)mh,t
+ (βˆ3 − β3)Sh,t−1 +Rt−1(βˆ4 − β4) + zh(βˆ5 − β5) + vˆh,t
This implies that the vectorized matrix v is asymptotically normal distributed
with mean the vectorized matrix vˆ and variance-covariance matrix XΩˆX ′, where
X is a matrix that contains rows [1;Bh,t−1;mh,t;Sh,t−1;Rt−1; zh].
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To optimize the loglikelihood function given above we use simulated maximum
likelihood estimation (e.g. Stern, 1997). We draw 1000 times from the distribution
f(η, ε|vˆ). For each draw j = 1, . . . , 1000 we follow procedure: (i) given the values
vˆ we generate a matrix vj, (ii) we generate a vector ηj with household specific
effects from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σˆ2η, (iii) we compute
the matrix of shocks εj = vj − ηj, (iv) we compute the likelihood contribution
and we weight this by pj = φ(εj), (v) To obtain the likelihood contribution of
an individual we sum the weighted individual likelihood contributions and finally
we optimize the sum of the logarithm of the individual likelihood contributions.
31
Year Sample size Number Average Rainfall in
at beginning of age of previous season
of year marriages marriage local Zimbabwe
Mpfurudzi
1994 215 34 20.5 0.69 0.52
1995 209 29 19.9 0.52 0.42
1996 202 26 19.3 0.77 0.70
1997 182 25 19.4 1.25 0.75
1998 180 17 18.4 0.70 0.53
1999 169 25 18.9 0.99 0.78
Mutanda
1994 84 9 21.1 0.72 0.52
1995 80 7 23.3 0.58 0.42
1996 86 10 18.4 0.93 0.70
1997 76 11 19.0 0.97 0.75
1998 63 3 18.3 0.70 0.53
1999 58 3 19.0 1.27 0.78
Sengezi
1994 60 7 20.0 0.52 0.52
1995 60 9 18.1 0.47 0.42
1996 55 9 19.9 0.90 0.70
1997 51 5 20.8 0.96 0.75
1998 44 1 16.0 0.72 0.53
1999 39 3 17.7 0.95 0.78
Total 233
Explanatory note: The quantity of rainfall is measured in meters per year and collected by the
Department of Meteorological Services in Zimbabwe.
Table 1: Some annual statistics of the sample of unmarried women in the age
interval between 15 and 30.
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Head of cattle
0-2 3-4 5+
1994 20.2 21.4 22.0
1995 19.1 22.4 21.4
1996 20.7 20.8 19.8
1997 20.4 19.3 21.0
1998 18.9 19.5 19.8
1999 19.2 17.5 19.7
Table 2: Average age at which a daughter gets married stratified by the year of
marriage and the herd size (cows, bulls, trained oxen and heifers) of the household.
Variable Average
Region
Mpfurudzi (%) 63
Mutanda (%) 21
Sengezi (%) 16
Individual characteristics
African faith (%) 17
Masowe faith (%) 6
Household characteristics
Missing (%) 10
Household size (persons) 12
Father absent (%) 17
Mother absent (%) 4
Age father (years) 53
Age mother (years) 45
Years of education father 5.1
Years of eduction mother 4.1
Number of observations 691
Explanatory note: Age of the father and the mother are measured at the moment the daughter
was 15 years of age. Household size is measured at the moment the women first appeared in
the stock sample.
Table 3: Stock sample characteristics.
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Year Sample size at Number of Average age
beginning of year marriages of marriage
1994 62 0 –
1995 122 1 16.0
1996 175 8 16.3
1997 204 13 17.1
1998 219 12 17.3
1999 221 23 18.6
Total 57
Table 4: Some annual statistics of the flow sample of unmarried women.
Year Livestock wealth
Not married Married
1994 9.7 −
1995 11.3 0.5
1996 12.0 6.6
1997 12.7 10.7
1998 13.6 9.1
1999 13.4 14.7
Explanatory note: In 1995, the prices (in Zimbabwean dollars) of cattle were: Cows 1200; Heifer
1000; Trained ox 1800; Young ox 1000; Bull 1500; and Goat 85.
Table 5: Average livestock wealth (in its real value in 1995) owned by the house-
hold, stratified by the women getting married in a particular year or not.
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Marriage hazard
Intercept
v −5.38 (0.99)
Baseline hazard (Age)
λ15−16 0
λ17−18 1.04 (0.40)
λ19−20 2.02 (0.52)
Region
Mpfurudzi 0
Mutanda −0.26 (0.39)
Sengezi −0.50 (0.45)
Faith
Christian 0
African −0.78 (0.67)
Masowe faith −0.40 (0.61)
Rainfall (in meters)
0.64 (0.77)
Individual and household characteristics
Oldest unmarried daughter 0.51 (0.35)
Missing 1.97 (0.56)
Household size 0.083 (0.027)
Parent absent 0.41 (0.39)
Livestock wealth shock (εi,t in cows) −0.10 (0.049)
Livestock wealth level (ηi in cows) −0.025 (0.026)
logL -185.76
N 333
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 6: Estimation results for the marriage rate.
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Bride wealth payments
Short term Long term
Intercept 1.02 (3.10) 1.73 (1.35)
Age −1.14 (0.090) 0.024 (0.051)
Rainfall −1.85 (3.11) −1.21 (1.51)
Oldest daughter 0.72 (0.62) −0.14 (0.41)
Livestock wealth (in cows) −0.043 (0.035) 0.027 (0.019)
σ 0.93 (0.037) 2.08 (0.097)
N 424 174
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7: Estimation results of the censored regression (tobit) model for the
amount of bride wealth (in cows) received in the year of marriage (short term)
and received in total (long term).
∆wh,t
∆wh,t−1 β1 0.053 (0.086)
∆mh,t β2 0.81 (0.64)
∆sh,t−1 β3 −0.0061 (0.098)
∆rh,t−1 β4 0.73 (0.64)
σ2ε 21.4
∆wh,t−1 ∆mh,t
Intercept γ0 0.80 (0.28) δ0 0.12 (0.019)
wh,t−2 γ1 −0.43 (0.028) δ1 −0.00064 (0.0019)
wh,t−3 γ2 0.42 (0.031) δ2 0.00025 (0.0020)
mh,t−1 γ3 0.70 (0.48) δ3 −0.92 (0.032)
∆sh,t−1 γ4 0.091 (0.073) δ4 0.0086 (0.0048)
∆sh,t−2 γ5 0.14 (0.063) δ4 0.011 (0.0041)
∆rh,t−1 γ6 0.19 (0.55) δ4 −0.0032 (0.036)
∆rh,t−2 γ7 0.36 (0.57) δ4 0.047 (0.037)
R2 0.20 0.48
F7,998 34.7 128.91
H 290∑H
h=1(Th − 1) 1006
Explanatory note: (corrected) standard errors in parentheses.
Table 8: Estimation results of 2SLS for β1, β2, β3, and β4.
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Intercept β0 10.53 (2.78)
Mutunda β5 −2.09 (1.31)
Sengezi β5 0.61 (1.35)
Parent absent β5 −1.67 (1.25)
African faith β5 2.05 (1.46)
Masowe faith β5 −0.058 (2.19)
σ2η 69.8
H 290
Explanatory note: (corrected) standard errors in parentheses.
Table 9: Estimation results of OLS for β0 and β5.
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Figure 1: The fraction of the marriages where all bride wealth payments are made
at a given number of years of marriage. This figure is based on a supplement held
in 1995 of the data used in this paper.
mt = 0
mt = 1
Figure 2: The marriage decision of households with Mt unmarried daughters
and Bt livestock wealth. The area mt = 1 describes where it is optimal for the
household to marry off a daughter. The amount of bride wealth is independent
of the amount of rainfall.
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mt = 0
mt = 1
Rt−1 = 0.7
Rt−1 = 0.8
Rt−1 = 0.9
Figure 3: The marriage decision of households with Mt unmarried daughters
and Bt livestock wealth. The area mt = 1 describes where it is optimal for the
household to marry off a daughter. The amount of bride wealth is decreasing in
the amount of rainfall.
Figure 4: The empirical marriage rate, i.e. the probability of getting married at
a given age conditional on still being unmarried when reaching this age.
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Figure 5: Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor function. This shows the per-
centage of women still unmarried at a given age.
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